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China’s Fiscal Stimulus and the 
Recession Australia Never Had: Is a 
Growth Slowdown Now Inevitable?
Creina Day1
Abstract
China’s timely and well-targeted two-year fiscal stimulus was particularly effective 
in stimulating growth in Australia’s commodity exports. Using a constructed series 
of export volumes to China, this paper finds that the post-stimulus GDP growth 
contribution from export volumes to China is significant. Had growth in export 
volumes to China been commensurate with pre-stimulus rates, Australia would 
have experienced three consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth — a 
technical recession. China’s gradual and uniquely revenue-based unwinding of fiscal 
stimulus reduces the risk to Australia of an imminent growth slowdown.
Introduction
One of the defining features of the Great Recession was the ‘sudden, severe and 
synchronized’ collapse in world trade for the December 2008 and March 2009 
quarters (Baldwin 2009). But just as small open economies, such as Australia, 
were vulnerable to the economic wellbeing of their trading partners, they 
also especially benefited from the fiscal stimulus implemented simultaneously 
worldwide.
This paper explores how, and to what extent, Australia benefited from the 
fiscal stimulus of its most important trading partner, China, and whether we 
may expect to witness a slowdown in growth as the unwinding of global fiscal 
stimulus begins in earnest in 2011.
Australia distinguished itself from other advanced economies by escaping a 
technical recession, defined as two quarters of negative growth in real GDP. The 
consensus that Australia experienced a slowdown but avoided a recession rests 
on the positive real GDP growth result for the March 2009 quarter.
1  The Crawford School of Economics and Government, the Australian National University; creina.day@anu.
edu.au The author thanks the editor, William Coleman, and a referee for constructive comments.
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The existing literature analyses the effectiveness of the Australian government’s 
package of cash transfers and infrastructure investment in countering a 
recession. Leigh (2009) finds cash bonuses were particularly effective in 
stimulating consumption. Lim et al. (2010) suggest cash for consumption 
was more effective in stimulating consumer confidence and that the effect of 
infrastructure investment, largely introduced at the bottom of the slowdown, is 
most likely delayed.
On the other hand, Makin (2010) finds that net exports, not Australia’s fiscal 
stimulus, was primarily responsible for offsetting a fall in private investment 
due to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). For the March 2009 quarter, the net 
positive contributions of private and public consumption totalling 0.3 per cent 
were minor in relation to the contribution from net exports of 2.0 per cent.
This paper builds on this growth analysis, which tells us how broad category 
GDP components changed, by exploring why exports rose both during and 
since the fiscal stimulus. It hypothesises that the rise in exports is in fact due, in 
part, to fiscal stimulus — that of the Chinese government. Of course, a rise in net 
exports can be due to a fall in imports, reflecting weakening domestic demand. 
Consistent with the global contraction in trade (IMF 2010a), for the December 
2008 quarter both Australian exports and imports fell by 1.4 and 8.3 per cent, 
respectively, over the previous quarter. However, in the March 2009 quarter, 
Australia broke from the pack with modest growth in exports of 1.6 per cent 
over the previous quarter. Since then, exports have contributed positively to 
real GDP growth in five out of seven quarters.
This paper adds to the existing literature on fiscal stimulus by examining two 
key questions that have been overlooked. Firstly, how much did growth in 
export volumes to China contribute to real GDP growth in Australia? Secondly, 
how will the unwinding of China’s fiscal stimulus affect Australia’s real GDP 
growth in the coming decade?
To address the first question, this paper constructs a quarterly data series, March 
2000 to September 2010, of export volumes to China, which it then uses to 
calculate the real GDP growth contribution from the growth in export volumes 
to China. The quarterly growth contribution series allows us to investigate 
the counterfactual: had the growth contribution remained at the average pre-
stimulus level, would Australia have experienced a recession?
To address the second question, the general budget balances of China are 
compared with those of other major economies. There is an explanation of why 
China’s planned composition of fiscal adjustment is unique and the implications 
of this for the Australian economy are discussed.
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China’s Stimulus to Infrastructure Investment
China was able to implement one of the largest and most timely fiscal stimulus 
packages (IMF 2010a). Natural growth in tax revenue2 provided China with 
fiscal ammunition unavailable to OECD countries. Accordingly, China’s fiscal 
package constituted a reallocation of spending to infrastructure rather than 
burgeoning debt.3 Policymakers pragmatically decided to accelerate already 
approved infrastructure projects. By shortening five-year implementation to two 
years, projects were able to get off the ground fast. A large part of the stimulus 
spending was diverted to building strategic stockpiles of raw materials.
Figure 1: China’s growth in fixed-asset investment (percentage change, 
year on year)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, Investment in Fixed Assets
As shown in Figure 1, growth in investment temporarily spiked in 2009 as a 
result of fiscal stimulus measures.4 China’s investment in fixed assets totalled 
22.48 trillion RMB in 2009, up 30.1 per cent year on year. Since the mid-1990s 
the share of infrastructure investment was declining while manufacturing 
gained share. Fiscal stimulus reversed this trend sharply in 2009.
2 The development of China’s tax system, primarily a consequence of urbanisation, has been sufficient to 
ensure that increases in tax revenue have accompanied surges in GDP growth (Tyers and Huang 2009).
3 In 2009, China’s fiscal deficit, as a percentage of GDP, was less than a third of the average of advanced G20 
economies (IMF 2010b).
4 Government fixed-asset investment was up 60 per cent year on year in 2009 (World Bank 2010).
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A priori, we would expect China’s fiscal stimulus to be especially effective in 
stimulating domestic economic activity for two reasons. Firstly, government 
investment directly affects aggregate demand, whereas government transfers 
and tax cuts stimulate household consumption via disposable income (see Gali 
et al. 2007). Secondly, since the Chinese currency is effectively pegged to the 
US dollar, China eases monetary policy in line with the United States. Domestic 
demand increases relatively more because of the low real interest rate. This is 
consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model, one of the workhorses of open-
economy macroeconomics, which predicts that fiscal policy is more effective in 
stimulating domestic output under pegged, rather than floating, exchange rates.
We would also expect fiscal stimulus in such a large and relatively open economy 
to have significant international spillovers. Consistent with the Keynesian view 
of the world, a fraction of the fiscal expansion is diverted to the rest of the 
world through higher imports.
Recent estimates of multiplier effects, based on ex-ante simulations, support this 
a priori reasoning. For emerging Asia, Freedman et al. (2010) estimate that the 
fiscal multiplier of a two-year stimulus is 2.0 and 0.7 on domestic and world GDP, 
respectively. For the US, the simulated effects on domestic and world GDP are 
almost half this magnitude. The emerging Asia two-year multiplier is consistent 
with a one-year multiplier for China of 0.84 (He et al. 2009).
Since a significantly larger share of imported mining products is used in 
construction than is used in manufacturing,5 we would expect the Chinese 
government’s spending on infrastructure to generate spillovers for major 
exporters of iron ore and coal, in particular. Cova et al. (2010) predict that 
China’s fiscal stimulus will raise exports from Japan and the rest of the world 
(including Australia) by four times the rise in exports from the US and euro area.
The significance of these spillovers to Australia is reflected in Figure 2. In 2009, 
both China and Australia recorded positive but slowing growth. In 2010, real 
GDP growth rose by 1¼ and 1¾ percentage points in China and Australia, 
respectively.
5 Construction uses around 5 per cent of minerals supplied domestically, compared with 35 per cent for 
manufacturing (National Bureau of Statistics of China). 
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Figure 2: Annual real GDP growth (percentage change, year on year)
Source: ABS, Australian National Accounts, Catalogue 5206.0; National Bureau of Statistics of China; IMF
To sum up, the Chinese government’s spending on infrastructure had:
•	 a larger effect on both China’s GDP and the rest of the world than any other 
G20 economy
•	 significant international spillovers via demand for exports, especially from 
Australia.
Did Increased Exports to China Avert a 
Recession?
To quantify the extent to which China’s increased demand for exports averted a 
technical recession in Australia, we need to:
•	 estimate the volume of merchandise exports to China; and
•	 isolate the contribution to growth in real GDP for each quarter.
On account of the significant changes in commodity prices over the critical 
‘recession we never had’ period, changes in the total value of merchandise 
exports to China will mask changes in demand. In Australian dollar terms, 
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commodity prices peaked in October 2008, falling by around 43 per cent 
through to October 2009. By January 2011, commodity prices were up 45 per 
cent from their low, but remained 18 per cent lower than their peak (RBA 2010).
So, to derive a series of export volumes to China, the total value of merchandise 
exports to China is deflated by the RBA Index of Commodity Prices (ICP) 
reflected in Australian dollars.6 Specifically, the monthly volume of merchandise 
exports to China for the period January 1988 to September 2010 is derived as:
Real (Volume of) Merchandise Exports to China ≈
 Merchandise Exports to China ÷ Index of Commodity Prices
which is then seasonally adjusted, using the X12 method.7 The monthly series is 
converted, to allow comparison with quarterly real GDP data.
Figure 3: Growth in real GDP and export volumes to China (per cent)
Source: ABS Cat. No. 5206.0, ABS Cat. No. 5368.0, RBA, and author’s calculations
6 The weights assigned to each commodity in the ICP reflect both the share of export volumes in 2008–09 
and the impact of subsequent price changes on export values. Reflective of Australian exports to China, 
mining commodities comprise almost 90 per cent of the index (RBA 2009). In particular, the ICP weights 
for metallurgical coal and iron ore closely reflect exports to China. In the absence of an official series of 
export volumes, by major trading partners, deflating export values by the ICP therefore provides a reasonably 
accurate measure of export volumes to China.
7 This method is undertaken using Eviews.
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Figure 3 reveals that since the global fiscal stimulus, growth in the volume of 
exports to China leads real GDP growth in Australia on a through-the-year basis. 
The question of averted recession relates to real GDP growth in each quarter 
(the bars in Figure 3). Thus, we wish to isolate the growth contribution from 
export volumes to China in each quarter.
We start with a decomposition of real GDP into expenditure components. With 
some algebraic manipulation, we obtain the growth contribution from each 
expenditure component. Specifically, the real GDP growth contribution from 
exports to China, for quarter t, is derived as:
(Volume of Merchandise Exports to China ÷ Real Australian GDP, t-1) × Growth 
in Volume of Merchandise Exports to China, t
= Contribution to Growth in Real Australian GDP, t
With reference to Figure 3, prior to the global financial crisis and fiscal stimulus, 
the growth contribution from exports to China is negligible, averaging less than 
one-tenth of one percentage point. However, there is a significant negative 
growth contribution in the December 2008 quarter, followed by a positive spike 
in the March 2009 quarter.
If Australia had continued to export to China, but without such anomalous 
growth in exports, we would have experienced three consecutive quarters of 
negative growth in real GDP (see dashed line in Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Real GDP growth contribution of export volumes to China (per cent)
Source: ABS Cat. No. 5206.0, ABS Cat. No. 5368.0, RBA, and author’s calculations
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In Table 1, the first four columns summarise the key series, depicted in Figures 
3 and 4, for the critical period September 2008–September 2009.We now 
consider the counterfactual: if real exports to China had grown at the average 
pre-stimulus rate, would Australia have experienced two quarters of negative 
real GDP growth? The average pre-stimulus rate is taken from 2003–04, which 
marks the beginning of the commodities boom.
Table 1: Contribution to real GDP(E) growth (percentage change, quarterly)
Real 
GDP 
Growth
Growth 
in Export 
Volumes 
to China
Growth 
Contribution 
from Exports 
to China
Real GDP Growth 
excl. Growth 
Contrib. from 
Exports to China
Real GDP Growth 
if Growth Contrib. 
at average rate 
Sep03–Jun08
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) – (iii) = (iv) (iv) + 0.065 = (v)
Sep – 2008 0.54 3.14 0.08 0.46 0.53
Dec – 2008 -1.00 -23.46 -0.63 -0.37 -0.31
Mar – 2009 0.97 55.85 1.17 -0.20 -0.14
Jun – 2009 0.31 20.72 0.67 -0.35 -0.29
Sep – 2009 0.65 7.56 0.29 0.35 0.42
Source: ABS Catalogue 5206.0; ABS Catalogue 5368.0; RBA; author’s calculations
The final column of Table 1 reveals that, had export volumes to China grown 
at the average pre-stimulus rate, Australia would have experienced a technical 
recession. Three quarters of negative growth under the counterfactual scenario 
is comparable with the actual experience of most advanced economies.
Will the Unwinding of Stimulus Slow Growth?
The preceding section’s analysis of the recent past raises questions about the 
near future. The world economy grew by around 5 per cent in 2010. With the 
return of buoyant global economic activity, the unwinding of fiscal stimulus is 
expected to gather momentum in 2011. Figure 5 shows, on the one hand, the 
structural shift of growing exports to China, commencing 2003–04, and on the 
other hand, the post-stimulus spike in 2009. Should Australia be concerned that 
some of the gains from growth in export volumes to China, quantified in this 
paper, will be reversed in the years ahead?
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Figure 5: Australian exports to China as a proportion of GDP (per cent)
Source: ABS Catalogue 5206.0; ABS Catalogue 5368.0
China ran a budget deficit of around 3 per cent of GDP in 2009, around 2.7 per 
cent higher than the previous year. While the Chinese authorities held their 
budget deficit broadly unchanged in 2010, they are expected to reduce it by 
around 1 per cent of GDP in 2011. Having said this, as shown in Table 2, China 
has a relatively low deficit (below 5 per cent of GDP). Accordingly, whilst the 
government has not published medium-term targets, it has voiced a preference 
for a relatively gradual adjustment in the overall budget balance (IMF 2010b).
Table 2: General government budget balance (percentage of GDP)
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012
China -3.1 -3.1 -2.1 -1.5
United States -12.7 -10.6 -10.8 -7.2
Japan -10.1 -9.4 -9.1 -8.0
United Kingdom -10.3 -10.3 -8.1 -6.1
Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor Update, 2011
China is unique in that, unlike other countries, budgetary improvements 
are likely to come largely from the revenue side, given the potential for high 
revenue growth. Therefore, the risk to growth in Australia’s export volumes to 
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China lies in the unwinding of government infrastructure spending. Growth 
in government-influenced fixed-asset investment has decelerated from the high 
base in 2009. However, the phasing out of active government construction 
projects will take years, and infrastructure spending on low-income housing 
projects has been recently announced (Ministry of Finance 2011).
Urbanisation, which underpins growth in not only tax revenue but also 
construction, is estimated to increase from 47.5 per cent to 51.5 per cent in the 
next five years (Wen 2011). In 2010, both strong real-estate investment growth 
and fast recovery in China’s export volumes, reflecting improved global demand, 
partly offset any slowdown in government-led demand for mineral imports from 
Australia (World Bank 2010).
On the one hand, the gradual unwinding of China’s government-led investment, 
strong real-estate investment and recovery in export volumes is good news for 
Australia. On the other hand, domestic demand is beginning to slow (World 
Bank 2010), suggesting the current pace of import growth may not last.
Conclusion
Australia enjoyed a double bonus during the global financial crisis: the first 
came from its own fiscal stimulus; the second from the public infrastructure 
spending of its major trading partner, China, reflected in increased exports. 
Given the timely implementation of infrastructure projects and a pegged 
exchange rate, China’s fiscal stimulus was particularly effective in stimulating 
demand for commodity exports from Australia.
Using a constructed quarterly series of export volumes to China, we find that 
since the global fiscal stimulus, growth in export volumes to China leads growth 
in Australia’s real GDP. The real GDP growth contribution from export volumes 
to China spiked in the March and June quarters 2009. Had export volumes to 
China grown at the pre-stimulus rate, Australia would have experienced three 
consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth.
Whilst growth in export volumes to China contributed significantly, especially 
to the positive real GDP growth result for the March quarter 2009, there is no 
denying the importance of other factors contributing to Australia’s real GDP 
growth. Rather, the post-stimulus real GDP growth contribution from growth 
in export volumes to China is a previously unidentified magnitude that is 
worth considering in light of both the recession Australia never had and the 
imminent unwinding of global fiscal stimulus. Fortunately for Australia, China’s 
unwinding of fiscal stimulus is likely to be gradual and uniquely revenue-based.
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